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Abstract: 
Faced with major challenges of global climate change, declining fossil fuel reserves, and 
competition between alternative uses of land, the transition to renewable transport fuels has been 
marked by new modes of political economic governance and the strategic direction of innovation. 
In this paper, we compare the different trajectories to the development and uptake of biofuels in 
Europe, Brazil and the USA. In terms of the timing, direction, and development of biofuels for road 
transport, the early lead taken by Brazil in sugarcane based ethanol and flex-fuel cars, the USA 
drive to corn-to-ethanol, and the European domination of biodiesel from rapeseed, manifest 
significant contrasts at many levels. Adopting a neo-Polanyian ‘instituted economic process’ 
approach we argue that the contrasting trajectories exemplify the different modes of politically 
instituting markets. We analyse the contrasting weight and impact of different drivers in each case 
(energy security, climate change mitigation, rural economy development, and market opportunity) 
in the context of diverse initial conditions and resource endowments. We explore the ‘politics of 
markets’ that arise from the different modes of instituting markets for ecologically sustainable 
economic growth, including the role of NGOs, the scientific controversies over land-use change, 
and the contrasting political institutions in our case studies. We also place our analysis in the 
historical perspective of other major carbon energy transitions (charcoal to coal, coal to petro-
chemicals). In so doing, we explore the idea of the emergence of new modes of governance of 
contemporary capitalist political economies, and the significance of politically directed innovation. 
The research is based on an extensive primary research programme of in-depth interviews with 
strategic players in each of the geographic regions, qualitative institutional analysis, a scenario 
workshop, and secondary data analysis.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Capitalist political economies are facing historically unprecedented challenges. Previous major 
“long wave” transformations, the agricultural and first industrial revolutions, the development 
of electric power and chemical industries, nuclear energy, and ICT transformations – all shifts 
in techno-economic paradigms (Freeman and Perez, 1988) – have occurred through expanding 
and adding to previous resources and technologies. Restricting the focus to energy and 
materials, the socio-economic utilisation of carbon has undergone successive historical 
changes, by discovery and exploitation of new resources: from wood, charcoal and peat to 
coal1 as a source of energy and chemicals, and from coal to the petro-chemical technological 
platform that established itself after the Second World War. Now, capitalism for the first time 
faces a drive to technological change arising from resource depletion: the threat of ‘peak oil’, 
and the declining availability at economic and political costs of a major primary source of 
energy and materials (IEA, 2008; Aleklett et al. 2009; Hirsch et al. 2005).  
Secondly, although historical capitalism has faced successive and significant challenges of 
pollution – lead in air and water threatening human health, CFCs creating the hole in the ozone 
layer, chemical pesticides (DDT), and so on – the scale and generality of the economic and 
ecological threat of Global Climate Change (GCC) are quite unprecedented, and present major 
challenges to the political direction and governance of capitalist economies. The significance of 
Stern (2007) is that it points to how current patterns of economic activity threatens 
continuation of those economic activities – quite apart from effects on human health, the 
ecology or the stability of the climatic system.  
Thirdly, there is of course a connection between these two unprecedented challenges: if 
climatic and geological history of the planet had been quite marginally different, peak oil or 
coal could have already have occurred decades ago, or be in the long distant future. In either 
case, the challenge of anthropogenic climate change would have coincided quite differently 
with the history of capitalist economic growth. We are where we are through a contingent 
alignment of geological and historical time.  And, fourthly and finally, routes out of fossil 
carbon dependency for energy and materials, themselves have considerable consequences for, 
and effects on, anthropogenic GHG, especially with increased competition for the use of land 
for increased food demand, as well as for biomass for non-food use – especially energy and 
materials. Production of food and agricultural uses of land are more significant emitters of GHG 
than total global transport (World Resources Institute, 2005; IPCC, 2009, Figure 2.1). 
Unprecedented circumstances may or may not drive unprecedented transformations in the 
political economies of capitalism.2 We attempt here to argue a case for considering the current 
shift in techno-economic paradigm as qualitatively different from previous ones, especially in 
terms of the pro-active and strategic role of states and international organisations in driving 
and shaping change. Failure of political direction at a national, regional or global level – the 
continuation of capitalism as usual – may jeopardise both the economic future of capitalism 
and the ecological sustainability of the planet. This argument is a complex one, and we need to 
pay close attention to some significant historical precedents, and will do so briefly below. 
 We develop the argument using the example of biofuels as liquid transport energy. The 
technological systems of fuels and vehicles (terrestrial and avian) have transformed the socio-
                                           
1 It can be argued that there was an emerging crisis of resource depletion in the use of wood and charcoal prior to the 
major shift towards the adoption of coal in the 17th and early 18th centuries (Thomas, 1986; Nef, 1932). But there is 
also much evidence that the availability of cheap coal in Britain created unique resource conditions in that country 
which partially explain why the industrial revolution started there (Allen, 2009). Charcoal and peat were relatively 
more abundant in those nascent industrial economies in continental Europe. 
2 We are reminded of the argument developed by Jared Diamond when considering socio-political-economies that have 
either survived or failed to meet resource depletion or climate change challenges, and his insistence on political and 
cultural adaptability (Diamond, 2005) Resilience theory has also made a significant contribution to this discussion (see 
Costanza et al., 2007; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2006). The notion of 
technology lock-in developed by David (1985) has been elaborated by Unruh (2000) to describe a more macro-scale 
techno-institutional complex reproducing carbon lock-in to a fossil fuel political economy. This approach also points to 
the systemic resistance that would be expected to place constraints on the creation of technological and institutional 
experiments for escaping carbon lock-in. 
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economic world since the beginning of the 20th century, with both the major components 
involved in interdependent changes. Small unit passenger vehicles (cars and motor bicycles) or 
HGVs (lorries, tractors, etc.) have experimented from the beginning with a variety of engines 
and fuels, electricity, ethanol, steam, petrol, diesel, with oil becoming the dominant design 
from early in the twentieth century to the present day. Liquid fuels are currently the only 
future alternative for air travel, but we believe that they will also continue to be a dominant 
technology for terrestrial vehicles for decades to come, especially in developing economies and 
for interurban, long distance travel. Hybrid electric-liquid fuel vehicles may play a significant 
role in this mix. The question is then whether liquid fuel will be derived from fossilised or 
renewable biomass. And the consequential question is whether the outcome will effectively 
meet the twin challenges of GHG reduction and economic sustainability or growth in the face of 
fossil resource depletion, and competition for land for increased and multiple demands. 
Whatever new balances might be struck between alternative transport systems, the flexibility 
of road transport vehicles and the historic investment in their infrastructures, in our view, 
make the vision of a world ‘after the car’ (Dennis and Urry, 2009; Urry, 2009), ‘after the 
tractor’ or ‘after the lorry’ premature, even restrictive. 
2 INNOVATION AND THE STATE: THEORY AND HISTORICAL 
EXAMPLE 
In this paper, we will be exploring three contrasting examples of politically directed pathways 
to biofuels in Europe, Brazil and the USA. In a sense, they can be seen as evidence of 
experimentation with new forms of political direction of innovation and techno-economic 
paradigm shift. In ways we shall explore below, they manifest some shared and novel political 
instruments, but also significant new variety creation in ‘politico-economic technologies’. They 
vary markedly in both innovation direction and political objectives in facing global challenges, 
representing embryonic examples of experimentation with novel forms of political direction of 
capitalist economies. We will be developing the ‘instituted economic process’ (IEP) approach to 
suggest a new historical turn in the relation between polity and economy in the innovation 
process. In particular, we will suggest that market-led innovation, where the dynamic of 
variation and selection is primarily located in firms and markets, is being supplemented by 
long-term, politically driven, innovation where new state political strategies and technologies 
are emerging in the face of unprecedented historical circumstances. There are new modes of 
politically instituting market economies, in this case, of transport energy. In making this bold 
claim, however, we need first to review both some of the literature of major historical 
technology transitions, and some major historical examples of state-driven innovation.  
There are two sides to the argument that we are entering a new historical phase for the role of 
the state in innovation. On the one hand, we suggest that there has been a long-standing 
theoretical underestimation of the role of states in shaping and driving innovation in both 
market and non-market economic modes.3 On the other, and connectedly, there are many 
significant historical examples of where states have intervened, often very forcefully, 
constituting the major catalysts of socio-technical change. So, in this respect we need to show 
how, and to what extent, current modes of politico-economic change are already different from 
previous ones, and in ways that appear to be developing, specifically to meet current 
challenges. 
Firstly, then, as a broad generalisation, in the Marxist and Schumpeterian views of major 
technological change, the historical waves of creative-destruction have primarily been driven 
by market actors in a market environment, in order to generate  ‘rents’ from competitive 
advantage gained by innovation. Strikingly, within this tradition Freeman and Perez’s 1988 
view of techno-economic paradigm shift is driven by market gains on input and output costs,4 
to which the socio-political infrastructures reaccommodate and adjust.5 The model is almost 
                                           
3 For an interesting historical perspective on the role of the state in economic thought, particularly in relation to 
innovation, see Reinert, 1999. 
4 New techno-economic paradigms involve ‘the system’s response to major changes in the price of new inputs, and 
new technologies which exploit their potential to reduce costs of both labour and capital, as a result of new total factor 
input combinations and organisational-managerial innovations.’ 58 
5 ‘It [paradigm change] shows the need for a full-scale re-accommodation of social behaviour and institutions to suit 
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one of where technologies and markets lead, states must follow. The engine of change lies 
within ‘the economy’. 
The National Systems of Innovation (NSI) literature accords the state and politics a much more 
prominent role in shaping and promoting innovation (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Nelson, 
1990; Lundvall et al. 2002; Freeman, 1987). A feature of the NSI approach, almost by 
definition, is that different political and state roles are analysed for the shaping of innovation 
and major technological change in countries such as Japan, Denmark and the USA. 
Nonetheless, overall a common feature of this analysis is the significance attached to the 
supporting role of the state for market-led, entrepreneurial innovation, whether in terms of 
providing the necessary public science base,6 creating facilitatory legal and contractual 
frameworks, and fostering technological learning between firms. There are different 
institutional environments, more or less supportive, shaping the patterns of innovation, the 
driving source of which remains primarily located within the market. That is where the ‘engine 
of progress’ is seated: the Marx-Schumpeter driving force placed in a conditioning and 
sustaining environment.7 As with the varieties of capitalism approach, the emphasis on the 
effects of different political systems, and different articulations of national systems with the 
global economy, is one that informs our analysis, conditioning the novel responses to novel 
challenges which we seek to analyse. We will aim to extend this analysis by suggesting that 
when circumstances alter, requiring significant and long-term strategic direction to change, the 
driving force of innovation, to a certain extent  and in some parts of the economy, shifts 
location from the market to the state.  
Over the past two or three decades, the ecological impacts of economic activity have become 
increasingly prominent, and perhaps sufficiently so, to count as such a change in 
circumstances. Where innovation (or sociotechnical) system ideas have been applied to the 
challenges of sustainable development, the principal focus has been on the role of government 
policy in supporting and protecting niches of novel sociotechnical innovations that might 
eventually challenge the dominant regime (for example, Rip and Kemp, 1988; Rotmans et al, 
2001; Geels, 2002). But this approach still views the principal dynamic of system transition to 
be one based on market competition, with government intervening at the edges to modify the 
rules of the market game; the key system-builders remain private actors. More recent 
contributions (Smith et al, 2005) have criticised the bottom-up approach, suggesting that 
there have been significant historical examples of system transition that have been steered by 
a much greater degree of longer term planning and explicit coordination by alternative 
governance regimes. In our view this correctly raises the possibility that, in some cases, 
governments (interacting with other actors within the governance regime) will be the driving 
force for system transition. 
Following this, we will be reflecting on emerging evidence that sustainability challenges such as 
climate change and peak oil appear to be drawing a more directed and significant intervention 
from governments, albeit to different extents in different regions. To describe our interest in 
the language of the multilevel transitions perspective, we are looking at possible changes to 
the landscape, a move away from the dominant neoliberal political economy of the post war 
period. But, as yet, the concept of the landscape is not sufficiently fleshed out to easily 
accommodate this question. 
However, we also suggested that these literatures underestimate major historical examples of 
the directive role of the state in innovation, where political strategy has been the central 
catalyst to socio-technical change8. And we will then argue that even with respect to these 
                                                                                                                                            
the requirements and the potential of a shift which has already taken place to a considerable extent in some areas of 
the techno-economic sphere. This reaccommodation occurs as a result of a process of political search, experimentation 
and adaptation [not conflict], but when it has been achieved, by a variety of social and political changes at the national 
and international level, the result good “match” facilitates the upswing phase of the long wave.’ 59 
6 ‘Universities are an important part of the modern capitalist engine. They are a recognised repository [sic] of public 
scientific and technological knowledge. They draw on it in their teaching. They add to it through their research.’ 
(Nelson, 1990, 206). 
7 ‘Over the years we have learned to do many things to make the original engine run more efficiently, with more 
power and less waste, and have learned to steer it at least broadly. We share knowledge, and coordinate action in 
certain situations. Public funding and government leadership have been used to make generic knowledge more readily 
public, and to guide and spur the system when this has seemed appropriate.’ (Nelson, 1990, 212) 
8 The historical examples of widespread nationalisation – socialisation of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy – 
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examples, the world has changed. This is obviously not the place for extended analysis, but 
the types of examples we can point to are first, military command economies (and, to a lesser 
extent, military driven innovation); 9 second, major infrastructures of utilities, transport and 
communication; third, health provision and medical innovation; 10 and fourth, food security and 
‘green revolutions’. 11 
Of course, there are a number well known historical examples of political strategy being the 
central catalyst for socio-technical change. The most relevant and testing example for our 
analysis can be taken from those sudden wartime episodes of ‘resource depletion’ that 
stimulated military command economies in Germany, the US and elsewhere to induce 
technological and industrial transformation whose consequences and achievements continued 
long into peacetime, and the relaxation of military command. Two major energy and materials 
transitions can be identified, one from the First World War the other from the Second. In the 
First World War both the USA and Germany were faced with a major disruption of the supply of 
nitrogen from Chilean guano. It is difficult to fight wars without nitrogen to make explosives, 
and nitrogen had already become a core resource for agricultural productivity, more acutely 
necessary to feed populations in times of wartime restrictions on international trade. As 
Hughes (1983) demonstrated,12 the production of nitrogen from atmospheric gases, using 
industrial chemistry, required enormously increased demands for electric power. In the USA 
and even more in Germany, this led to military command political strategies for transforming 
and scaling-up electric power generation and transmission networks, especially the formation 
of regional grids. The experience of war, he argued, was an inspiration to postwar ‘planned 
systems’, where coordination between market and public actors, integration and 
standardisation of smaller scale economies of electrical energy, was required.  
An even more apposite case relates to the emergence of the petro-chemical technological 
platform that came to dominate the market economies of the second half of the 20th century. 
Contrary to the macho-entrepreneurial symbolic weight of oil in capitalist mythology, military 
command economies were critical in the transformation process. Again key energy and 
material resources were dramatically curtailed: in the run up to the Second World War, 
Germany lost access to both oil and rubber, the USA had plentiful resources of oil, but was 
suddenly cut off from supplies of rubber from Malaysia and the Far East. Under Nazi 
dictatorship, the German chemical industry was driven to develop alternative liquid fuels and 
synthetic rubber (the future building blocks of plastics) from coal. The consequence was a 
period of intense and pressured innovation, resulting in key developments in catalysis and 
refinery (Spitz, 1988). The production of syngas and liquid fuels from coal for aviation and 
terrestrial transport, fractionating refinery outputs, were amongst the major advances.  In the 
USA, under a military command economy, the government engaged in industrial 
reconstruction, pushing together the chemical and petrol refinery industries, in order to 
develop the polymers to produce synthetic alternatives to rubber (Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1998; Spitz, 1988).13 Extreme as circumstances and political regimes were, key innovations in 
                                                                                                                                            
could also have been included in this analysis, with state control over gas, steel, coal, railways, roadhaulage, car 
manufacturing, telecommunications, all included in the UK experience. The subsequent privatisations have also 
entailed states constructing and shaping the industrial architecture and markets, including the innovation environment. 
Our focus, however, is to emphasise the role of the state even in those historical conditions that are not claiming to 
challenge the foundations of capitalist political economies. 
9 Major contributions with respect to military-inspired innovation are provided by Noble, computerised design and 
aircraft innovation (Noble, 1986), and McKenzie (1996), again on computerisation in relation to control systems. 
Another is the www. See also Ruttan, 2005. 
10 Mokyr, 1998. 
11 Conway, 1997; Evenson and Gollin, 2003. 
12 In addition to the significance of military command economies for politically driven innovation, Hughes provides 
important examples of the varieties of political shaping of innovation of earlier electrification in his comparison of 
Chicago (market led), Berlin (political and market synergy) and London (political obstruction followed by political 
leadership of innovation). 
13 Spitz (1988) gave a much more detailed and insiders view of the formation of the petro-chemical technology 
platform, but also a much more trenchant account of the role of political direction in both the USA and Germany. 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1998), heavily reliant on this source, fail to extract the full significance of the political shaping 
of paths of innovation. Wartime is almost reduced to a temporary passage, so not requiring its lessons to be integrated 
into an analytical framework: ‘The Second World War thus transformed the rubber industry from one that depended on 
nature for its primary raw material to an industry that depended on new chemical processing technology for its 
primary inputs. The wartime experience of this industry is a compelling illustration of the ability of a technologically 
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refinery, industrial chemistry, and the reorganisation of industry, were driven by political and 
military command. They laid the foundations for the post-war petro-chemical world that we 
have since become accustomed to and dependent upon – even to the extent that the US petrol 
and chemical industries looted14 the German chemical industry for key technologies advanced 
under dictatorship and wartime command (Spitz, 1988). This techno-economic paradigm shift 
was clearly driven by the twin exigencies of abrupt and extreme resource reduction and the 
objectives of war. So, our challenge to making a case for the novelty of current politically 
driven innovation for renewable and ecologically sustainable energy is to draw both parallels 
and differences with these more abrupt and temporary circumstances of resource crises 
created by the First and Second World Wars. 
Aside from electrification, many examples could be adduced to illustrate the significance of 
variably  politically driven innovation in infrastructures, so only a brief example related to 
vehicular transport is worth highlighting here: the construction of the US Interstate Highway 
System. Interestingly, the USA road network was developed exclusively within the capitalist 
political economy epoch, without the legacy of previous national road network systems – even 
dating back to the Romans. If the car is iconic of individualist consumer market capitalism, it 
has run on roads developed as public goods, built by private contractors, but as exemplary of 
non-market socio-technological innovation system. There are strong arguments, especially 
following the construction of the autobahn network in Germany, that public road design drove 
car design and technology innovation (aerodynamics, tyres, engine performance, chassis), as 
much as vice versa (Flink, 1988). The US Interstate Highway System developed over a long 
period, often political battleground, between federal, state, and market interests – and was 
significantly driven by consumers, and organised consumer demand for higher quality roads 
(Lewis, 1997).15 Ultimately, however, and partially reflecting wartime experiences and defence 
objectives, a pro-market cold war Republican President, Eisenhower, legislated for and funded 
the creation of the renowned Interstate Highway System, nationally integrated, standardised, 
and regulated, coast to coast, North to South.16 The result transformed not only deep rural 
isolation17 but urban and suburban design with its novel public infrastructure for private 
mobility. The Interstate System abandoned pre-war experimentation with private tolls, and 
became more not less public with the expansion of car mobility (Flink, 1970; McNichol, 2006). 
The state thus played a critical role in US national economic market integration, and the 
creation of new economic activity multi-level scales, in the process. The interdependence 
between non-market and market economies manifest in the Interstate Road System 
exemplifies the multi-modal growth dynamic of capitalist political economies: roads fit for cars 
and trucks, trucks and cars fit for roads. This growth dynamic was fuelled by the virtuous 
circle, across market and state governed economic activity, which connected greater use of 
roads to increased revenue from road taxation to investment in expanding the road network, 
which stimulated further demand, thereby initiating the cycle again.  
                                                                                                                                            
dynamic economy such as the United States to overcome natural resource constraints’ !!! (op. cit. 91-2). 
14 Appropriated technology by the victor’s force majeur, rather than normal market modes of acquisition. 
15 As an example of consumer-driven innovation but non-market provision, the creation of roads fit for bicycles, first 
mobilised by the League of American Wheelmen in the 1890s and subsequently taken forward by automobile 
consumer groups, provides an interesting historical bi-line (Flink, 1970). 
16 The Federal-Aid Highway Act, 1956 financed the construction of 41,000 miles of new roadway through the Highway 
Trust Fund, which was based on hypothecated petrol, diesel, and tyre taxation, after many alternatives had failed. This 
peculiar state financing has been described as ‘a virtual Möbius strip of money: the more cars travelled, the more gas 
they consumed; the more gas meant more momey to build more miles of highways; which allowed more cars to travel 
more miles and consume more gas.’ (Lewis, 1997, 127). As an engineering feature, it rivals the Great Wall of China as 
the most visible human construction to be seen from space, as ‘the largest engineering project in history’. Ironically, 
the architect in the Senate of the Bill that financed the Interstates was none other than Albert Gore Snr, making him 
indirectly responsible for one of the largest carbon footprints in history – a legacy now addressed by his son. 
17 One of the key economic aspects of road infrastructure development was to continuously connect rural communities 
and homesteads to the wider world, as was clear from the interwar programmes developed by Thomas McDonald at 
the Bureau of Public Roads, the legendary figure of American road mythology. Remarkably, before the post-Second 
World War road development, many parts of the US were cut off from each other, often for months at a time, because 
of inaccessible mud tracks.  
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3 UNPRECEDENTED HISTORICAL CHALLENGES 
In considering the parallels and differences between the politically driven innovation of 
transport energy today and these historical examples related to abrupt but temporary resource 
depletion or economic scale integration requiring national standardisation and regulation, we 
suggest that global climate change and peak oil represent circumstances that are unparalleled 
in scale and nature, and that only politically driven, long-term and strategic innovation offers 
any possibility of overcoming limits to growth, whether for food, energy or materials. Markets, 
including futures markets, do not operate on the time-scales or provide the incentives 
sufficient or relevant to bring about this transformation. The oil shocks can be seen as a 
prelude or harbinger of progressive depletion of finite resources, and in that respect point to 
parallels with previous military command economies – and the first stages of our Brazilian 
example will bring this to the fore. But they were temporary, and at the extreme end of 
politically manufactured resource constraints. As is already clear from OPEC political strategies 
at Copenhagen, the use and availability of fossil fuel to market will involve a dynamic of 
political, economic, and material resource endowment characteristics: who controls what type 
of oil, where. There has not been, and will not be, any simple physical ‘peak oil’ created by 
technologically available means of extracting finite physical resources (Cavallo, 2005, Sorrel et 
al, 2009). Extreme turbulence in prices of oil, swings from $148 per barrel to $35, and back to 
$75 over the space of a year, and more importantly swings from growth to severe economic 
depression (Hirsch et al. 2005), are already reflections of what might happen in the absence of 
a strategic political drive to develop renewable energy. Market-driven innovation on its own 
has already proved insufficiently radical or urgent in the face of petro-chemical depletion – and 
many have argued that even with strong market signals, economic and political actors have 
largely been in denial (Legget, 2005). A glance at Figure 1 below demonstrates the powerful 
market signals of oil market price, that, even granted the academic consensus on the negative 
relationship between oil price rises and GDP growth (Jones, 2004), have failed to induce any 
strategic response by market actors to shift away from oil dependency. Perhaps, the long 
period of price stability induced narcosis, only interrupted by the occasional nightmares of oil 
price spikes – until one regards the steady upward trend from 1998, and especially the current 
bounce back to 1979 levels even in a period of global recession. 
 
Figure 1: Oil prices, nominal and inflation adjusted, 1946-2009. Source www.bis.gov 
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Likewise with the economic costs of global climate change, the central implication of the 
analysis developed by Stern (Stern, 2006) is that future economic risks are effectively invisible 
in current markets, and the distribution of future risk across populations and regions surpasses 
any temporal or geographical scale of spontaneously-emerging market incentives to innovate 
to sustainability. When it comes to finding a substitute for something as fundamental to the 
economy as oil, only scientifically informed, politically-led and long term strategic innovation – 
as well as regulation – offers capitalist political economies a possible route to sustainable 
economic growth. There is, of course, a question mark, to which we shall return, as to 
whether, at a national, regional, or international level, such concerted political direction will 
emerge to face these combined challenges. This, then, is the novelty of circumstance that 
requires novelty of political management of economies. Our empirical studies explore the 
manner and extent of varied responses. 
4 POLITICALLY INSTITUTED MARKET ECONOMIES OF 
ENERGY 
The theoretical approach advanced here is an ‘instituted economic process’ approach, which 
we believe is useful because it allows us to explore varieties of modes of instituting economies. 
Arguing for a concept of a dynamic and variable multi-modality of capitalist economies, the 
framework avoids dualisms of state (planning) versus market (spontaneously emergent, 
universalistic). From previous work, we take as our starting point that market economies are 
as instituted, historically and socially, as non-market, public economies (Harvey, Quilley and 
Beynon, 2002; Harvey, Ramlogan and Randles; Harvey, 2010, forthcoming). Thus, for 
example, the supermarket system of food provisioning, distribution, exchange and 
consumption within the UK is an historically instituted and evolving system, markedly different 
from the instituted food economies of the USA or continental European countries – and 
markedly different from UK food provisioning of just two or three decades ago. Likewise,  we 
have attempted to show how novel public economies of knowledge, new forms of public 
‘commons’, involving knowledge production, distribution, appropriation and use, have become 
instituted during the on-going revolution in the biological sciences and technologies (Harvey 
and McMeekin, 2007). These have been seen as the outcome of processes of differentiation 
and interdependence between public and private modes of economic organisation. 
The key development of this approach which we aim to address here concerns the complex 
interaction between economic and political modes of instituting economic processes, and in 
this case, for economies of transport energy whose distribution and exchange are organised in 
markets. So here we are exploring politically directed market innovation, in contrast both to 
market-led innovation and innovation by state enterprises in previous historical periods. On 
the one side, there are the political ‘technologies’ of directing innovation, a wide range of 
instruments, objectives, and strategic visions. On the other, there are varieties of emergent 
economic organisation of production, distribution and exchange, often with new classes of 
economic agent, but significantly with new industrial divisions of labour, horizontal and 
vertical. For example, agribusiness has emerged as a significant new component in many of 
the new divisions of labour, with sugar companies now providing energy for cars as well as 
calories for humans! The interaction between political direction and emergent economic 
organisation is complex in the sense that pre-existing economic organisation often conditions 
political direction, on the one hand, and on the other, political direction may not directly plan 
or coordinate the organisation of market actors, except, notably, in the case of nationalised 
entities. In some cases, political direction is limited to an orientation to something as general 
as ‘renewable energy’, without determining who might provide what renewable energy, or in 
what mix. In others, the political direction can be much more prescriptive – a mandated target 
of x% of biofuel to be blended with a fossil fuel. But here too, the political direction falls well 
short of picking specific technological winners, let alone the shape of the industry providing the 
mandated commercial product. So, in comparing the sharply contrasting trajectories of 
transition in Brazil, the USA and Europe, we will be analysing the outcomes of complex 
interactions, resulting in a variety of forms of politically instituted economies of transport 
energy, and forms of emergent economic organisation that occurred as a consequence of 
governmentally oriented innovation. The term ‘politically instituted’ thus covers the full range 
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of possibilities from fully planned economies to light touch steerage and orientation. The 
advantage of the IEP approach is precisely that it concerns itself with this variation and 
interaction of modes of instituting economic processes. 
When considering the political technologies of directing innovation, we will be exploring a wide 
range of instruments affecting both supply and demand side with policies impacting on: the 
science base; the innovation process, through to commercialisation; the demand side in fuel 
markets; the coordination of the fuel-vehicle system; innovation to meet sustainability 
regulation; and international trade. Given that one of the central framing conditions involves 
resource depletion, one of the key and variable determinants of political strategy concerns the 
resource endowments of the different regions, whether in terms of fossil fuels, or in terms of 
comparative advantage of biomass, between sub-tropical and temperate zones, for example. 
These preconditions become more significant the more there is reliance on bioeconomy 
alternatives to fossil carbon. It might be thought that regional vulnerability to impacts of 
climate change – frequency and severity of extreme events such as hurricanes, for example – 
might similarly act as determining conditions for political orientation. But we shall see that 
Europe, perhaps the least immediately vulnerable region, stands out for shaping its orientation 
by concerns of sustainability and climate change mitigation. So, we look elsewhere in the 
political culture to account for this variation. 
In this section, the current politico-economic challenges to sustainable economic growth have 
been put in theoretical and empirical context, in order to understand the parallels and 
differences in the transition to renewable and sustainable energy, in particular with respect to 
terrestrial and aviation transport. In the next section, we turn to our empirical comparative 
analysis of three contrasting transition pathways. A thumbnail summary of the contrasts 
highlights the issues at stake: 
Brazil: the initial establishment of a major political programme of replacing dependency on 
fossil fuel with bioethanol from sugarcane was a response to the two oil shocks of the 
1970s, so pointing to parallels with earlier abrupt and temporary resource depletions. Yet 
the continuity of the development into the present era both changed the context and the 
drive behind the continued expansion, notably with the development of a transport fleet 
of Flex-Fuel Vehicles (FFVs). 
USA: after a brief episode of a drive to bioethanol following the oil shocks, and the USA’s 
own national ‘peak oil’ in 1972 (Defeyes, 2001), the USA’s political drive to energy 
security and independence has been based on bioethanol derived from home grown 
maize, and a subsequent major programme to shift towards ligno-cellulosic bioethanol. 
‘Europe’: although there is much diversity between European nations, a pan-European 
framework for renewable energy has focused predominantly on greenhouse gas 
mitigation, this being achieved in the main through renewable biodiesel derived from 
domestic rapeseed, supplemented by imported bioethanol, and some bioethanol derived 
from domestic sugarbeet and wheat. 
Thus, the three regions are contrasting in political objectives, in biomass resources, and in 
fuel-vehicle systems. In this analysis, we will be necessarily schematic, focusing particularly on 
the aspects of politically driven innovation, the processes of politically instituting biofuel 
economies of energy. 
5 THREE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES OF ENERGY: BRAZIL, 
THE USA, AND EUROPE 
5.1 Brazil 
Brazil currently enjoys the highest levels of consumption of renewable transport fuels in the 
world (at approximately 40%), using bioethanol from sugarcane, generally regarded to be the 
most beneficial for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions of all current technologies 
(Goldemberg and Guardabassi, 2008; Zuurbier and van de Vooren, 2008; Smeets et al 2008; 
Brehmer and Sanders, 2009: Macedo and Noguiera, 2005; Macedo et al. 2005). There has, 
however, been a long and winding developmental path – with some sharp turns, but one that 
has been characterised by a markedly directive state for most of the last 80 years. The 
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sugarcane and sugar producing sector exemplified this pre-history of Brazilian biofuels, with 
the Istituto de Azucar e Alcool (IAA) established in 1933 by President Vargas, imposing an 
integrated market price, price stability, production quotas for different regions, and centralised 
distribution and a monopoly exporter (Johnson, 1983; Nurnberg, 1986). This policy was 
motivated by a development strategy, particular in circumstances of high volatility of world 
commodity prices. 
Under the dictatorship of the Generals (1964-85), ‘state entrepreneurship’ became a major 
development strategy, notably with the formation of Petrobras, the national petroleum 
company, and its affiliated petrochemical industrial base (Evans, 1979, 1982). When 
confronted with the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, although initially resistant, Petrobras was to 
become a central strategic instrument for the substitution of imported petrol by home grown 
bioethanol from sugarcane. The pre-existing concentration and centralisation of the sugarcane 
industry under the IAA dovetailed with this strategy, partly as it coincided with yet another 
global collapse in sugar prices.18 The two phases of the strategy, established under legal 
decrees, responded in turn to each of the oil price shocks, ProAlcool  and ProAlcool II in 1975 
and 1979 respectively, described as a ‘politicised market economy’ for energy (Barzelay, 
1986). What makes this first phase of Brazilian bioethanol strategy distinctive was the 
combination of development with energy security objectives in response to sudden, if 
temporary, ‘resource depletion’. The savings in oil imports alone resulting from bioethanol 
substitution, even following Brazil’s own oilfield discoveries and exploitation, amounted 
annually to between US$500 million and US£1 billion, in the 1980s and 1990s, totalling $69 
billion in saved imports for the duration of the programme (De Almeida et al. 2007). In many 
ways, this placed Brazil in a uniquely advantageous position, exploiting its distinctive 
resources, including the high conversion potential of solar energy into biomass in the sub-
tropics (Mathews, 2007). 
As suggested, the ProAlcool strategy is marked by two phases, each entailing novel political 
instruments within a broad orientation (Lehtonen, 2007; Puppim de Oliveira, 2002; Rosillo-
Calle and Cortez, 1998). In the first phase, there was a mandated uptake of 20% anhydrous 
ethanol, which could be blended with petrol without requiring vehicle engine modification. 
Petrobras was mandated to purchase the bioethanol from state subsidised biorefineries at a 
fixed price. The IAA was funded to develop a national agricultural research programme to 
develop new varieties of sugarcane, to optimise sugar content for bioethanol conversion. 
Petrobras, already monopoly distributor of petrol, extended its role as blender and distributor 
of the fuel. 
The response to the second oil shock was to move to a much more radical phase, this time 
including a transition to new vehicles, so entailing a fuel-vehicle technology system. Engines 
developed by the state controlled Centro Tecnologia Aeronautica to run on 100% hydrous 
ethanol were manufactured, by negotiated agreement and government signed contracts with 
the major global car manufacturers (Fiat, VW, Mercedes Benz, GM and Toyota) (Goldemberg, 
2008). In fact, manufacturers saw this as a market opportunity – albeit politically constructed 
– and actively sought and promoted the development of an ethanol car fleet (Barzelay, 1986), 
producing 250,000 cars by 1980, 350,000 by 1982. Using procurement as an instrument, all 
state cars were obliged to be 100% ethanol, and subsidies were given on vehicle prices. By the 
early 1980s, 80% of all new vehicles sold were ethanol-only. 
The period of military dictatorship manifested strong and authoritarian political direction – 
symbolised by the effective imposition of the 100% ethanol car – but nonetheless entailed the 
emergence of new markets, with both indigenous and foreign capital and market players: the 
‘tripod’ (tri-pé) policy of development based on a combination of multinational, national and 
local enterprises under state tutelage (Evans, 1979, 1982). The fall of the dictatorship, and the 
establishment of a democratic political regime, saw the dismantlement of some, but by no 
means all, of this political legacy. The ethanol blending mandate remained, and the pure-
ethanol car effectively disappeared. Fuel prices were de-regulated between 1997 and 1999, 
and under the Washington consensus, the Cardoso government pursued a policy of stimulating 
                                           
18 The difference in political regimes and correlative industrial organisation, as well as rural class and property 
structures, might explain why Brazil, rather than India, was able to develop its sugarcane industry into a major 
producer of bioethanol following the oil price shocks. As a consequence, India lost its premier world position as a sugar 
producer, and was significantly outstripped by Brazil. 
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FDI. The IAA was abolished in 1990, but with the result that the primary sugarcane producing 
region in South Central Brazil effectively eliminated the previously cross-subsidised North East 
region, which had always been marginal to ethanol production. Petrobras remained a dominant 
player, if less of a direct agent of government policy. Oil prices returned to their pre-shock 
levels – until the progressive rise in the late 1990s, but the relative end price of ethanol to 
consumers remained below 60% that of petrol for most of the first decade of this century, only 
briefly going above 70% twice (De Almeida et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 2: Development of the Brazilian ethanol sector, millions of tons of processed Sugarcane. 
Source, Romanelli, 2007 
 
So, in spite of liberalisation of the economy, the period from 1985-1997 was one of stagnation 
at the peak levels achieved under the ProAlcool programme. And, at this point, it is worth 
emphasising this renewable technology platform that had been created under dictatorship had 
no ecological imperative behind it – a politically anachronistic perspective at that time – and so 
achieved major ecological benefits accidentally.19 Following a period of volatility in the late 
1990s, a new surge in bioethanol production occurred, with the evolution of both new political 
orientation and new political ‘technologies’. The development pathway continued to play a 
significant role throughout, with the biofuel industry a significant sector, employing 700,000 
directly, and a further 200,000 indirectly – 100 times more jobs per unit of energy than the oil 
industry (De Almeida et al. 2007). But, especially after Brazil’s major oil discoveries in the Tupi 
oilfields, the energy security dimension diminished in significance compared with the growth of 
the global export market. During this period, Brazil became the premier exporter of world 
bioethanol. Nonetheless, given the price trend of fossil fuels, bioethanol has been becoming 
more competitive, especially in the domestic market, placing Brazil in an enviable advantage in 
facing global petro-chemical resource depletion. 
                                           
19 There was a major concern over pollution, particularly in Sao Paolo, and ethanol cars were seen as ecologically 
beneficial in reducing urban pollution – but not for greenhouse gas mitigation. 
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Under President Lula, a range of new political directions to innovation have occurred, although 
in a very different mode to that under the dictatorship. Petrobras has continued to lead 
innovation in fuel development, and has been supported by the state in creating the 
infrastructure for expanding exports. Its R&D facilities at CENPES are closely integrated with 
the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. It continues to dominate distribution and orchestrates 
the development of biofuel supply from major refining companies, such as Dedini, and 
Copersucar, the sugar producers’ federation. 
Perhaps the most visible and significant development has been the emergence of the fully flex-
fuel vehicle, capable of running on 0-100% of petrol, liquid gas, or bioethanol. Again, the 
government played a key role in negotiating with car manufacturers for the production of FFVs, 
guaranteeing subsidies on purchase. As a consequence, already by 2006 80% of new car sales 
were FFV, presenting the advantage for the consumer of eliminating the risk of relative price 
shifts between fuels in a period of considerable volatility. The effects of the FFV innovation on 
domestic market growth of bioethanol production are seen in Figure 2 above. It can now claim 
to be the most advanced fuel-vehicle technology system in the world. 
In terms of the strategic and long term political support for a shift to renewable bioenergy, 
there has been major funding of both basic scientific research, often co-ordinated with 
commercial R&D, with a vision of coordinated innovation from crop, cultivation, biorefinery 
through to multi-product outcomes. FAPESP, the Sao Paolo State research funding body, has 
supported the development of sugarcane genomics, and the development of transgenic and 
advanced hybridisation technology sugarcane in the technology cluster near the University of 
Campinas (notably Allelyx and Canavialis). 20 Dedini has developed world leadership in 
biorefinery, with advanced operations producing surplus electricity from bagasse, as well as 
fertiliser from vinasse (previously a pollutant to the water-table). The production of electricity 
for the grid (bio-electricity) has quadrupled between 1995 and 2005, now yielding 3% of the 
total electricity supply.  Dedini, supported by FAPESP, has been operating a commercial 
demonstration plant with Copersucar, for ligno-cellulosic bioethanol since 2003, producing 
5,000 litres per day. Many of these state-supported research developments have entailed long-
term commitments, and would not have occurred, certainly not in such a coordinated manner, 
as a response to erratic and fragmented market signals. 
Finally, Lula initiated a biodiesel programme, which had the joint aims of diminishing Brazilian 
dependence on imported diesel, developing new technologies and crops, and specifically 
targeting poverty reduction for small farm holders (Wilkinson and Herrera, 2008). Thus, 
Petrobras has been assigned the role of guaranteed purchaser in auctions for a variety of crops 
(jatropha, castor, soy) from small holders especially in the North East. In order to develop this 
market, again with a long term vision, mandates now dropped for ethanol, are imposed for 
biodiesel, with a 2% blend required for 2008, rising to 5% in 2013, under the 2005 National 
Programme for the Production and Use of Biodiesel (De Sousa and Dall’Oglio, 2008; Pousa et 
al. 2007). Petrobras itself is also taking the opportunity of this politically underwritten market 
to develop its own technology of producing biodiesel, HBio. 
Finally, in the current global context, biofuel production in Brazil has entered firmly into the 
perspective of greenhouse gas mitigation and biodiversity protection. Whilst leading the world 
almost by accident in the first instance, it now is promoting sustainability certification of all 
biofuels, and a zero deforestation policy – although no sugarcane is grown within a 1000 
kilometres of the Amazon, and most expansion of sugarcane production has been at the 
expense of low-intensity pasturage. As Mathews has pointed out, one of the conditions of 
developing a biofuels futures market, now established in Brazil, has been quality assurance 
and standardisation, including regulation for sustainability (Mathews, 2008). 
Whether under the dictatorship or under the democratic regimes that followed it, there is thus 
evidence of a strategic political vision for the development of renewable transport fuel, 
certainly with an economic development agenda, and prompted by resource crises. We have 
attempted to demonstrate that this vision has evolved, recognising also the significance of 
major changes in political regime, contrasting authoritarian with democratic political 
governance of the transition. The 100% ethanol car was a vehicle of dictatorship, whereas the 
                                           
20 The early initiatives by FAPESP to stimulate Brazilian capabilities in genomic technologies have been described by 
Harvey and McMeekin (2005).   
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FFV gave choice of fuel, and lifted risk from the consumer, whilst both ensured the significant 
expansion of the biofuel industry in their respective periods. Multiple instruments were used, 
and even if Petrobras as a nationalised industry played a continuously strategic role 
throughout, its status changed under different political regimes, from a state-enterprise arm of 
government, to a semi-independent market actor with a large state shareholding. The 
democratic mode of political governance undoubtedly built on the platform created under 
dictatorship, demonstrating a continuity in the evolution of strategy. As a consequence, Brazil 
now represents the country most advanced in the world for developing renewable transport 
energy, with significant benefits to greenhouse gas mitigation. 
5.2 The USA 
Any understanding of the political shaping of the USA’s shift towards renewable transport fuels 
needs to start with a distinction between resource security and resource availability: there 
could be plenty of a given energy resource, but access to it can be secure or insecure; or there 
could be diminishing energy resources, irrespective of whether there is access or not to it. 
Insecurity can be relatively temporary. Depletion is permanent. So insecurity may give 
temporary signals to shift to alternative resources, and then disappear over the political time-
horizon. The high cost effects of insecurity and scarcity can be the same, and they can of 
course interact: insecure access to a diminishing resource. Finally, the political optimum might 
well be secure access to a plentiful resource: from an oil rich nation once in that position, it 
could be argued that the USA strives to regain it. For many European nations, this has never 
been an option: energy self-sufficiency has not been and is unlikely ever to be a realistic 
possibility. But once the US had past its peak oil in around 1972, the next decades of oil 
shocks rapidly demonstrated that the security aspect of access to oil was to become 
increasingly important. Figure 3 below demonstrates just how dependent the USA  is on Middle 
East oil – as the rest of the world had always been, in spite of a brief respite afforded by the 
North Sea discoveries. Around 60% of the known world oil reserves are concentrated in the 
Middle East, and 40% travels through the Straits of Hormuz. 
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Figure 3: The world distribution of oil resources, as estimated by the IEA, 2004 
As with Brazil, therefore, the first major impulse to develop biofuels arose from the temporary 
signals of the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, but in the case of the US, without any development 
dimension, the political response was overwhelmingly a matter of energy security. The first 
shock prompted the 1974 Solar Energy Research, Develop and Demonstration Act, including a 
prescient promotion of research for the development of ligno-cellulosic ethanol. The second 
marked a much more significant push towards the development of home-grown energy to 
supplement diminishing domestic oil reserves: the 1980 Energy Security Act. As suggested by 
the title, the political shaping was defined by security, incentivising domestic ethanol producers 
with excise tax credits and erecting barriers to trade – still existing – to restrict ethanol 
imports. Research funding of projects for developing biofuels from biomass were put in place, 
and notably in 1979 President Carter approached ADM, the large agricultural processing 
company, to switch some biorefineries from producing alcohol to producing ethanol. By the 
end of the 1980s, ADM was producing 80% of US bioethanol. 
But compared with Brazil, the response to the abrupt resource constraints was minor and 
short-lived, as demonstrated by the Figure 4 below: the significant increase in bioethanol 
production occurred from the late 1990s, and sharply so only in the first decade of this 
century. 
 
Figure 4: The growth of US bioethanol production 
Between 1980 and 2010, the net imports of total US consumption of crude oil had risen from 
41% to 66% (IEA, 2006), and the cost of maintaining a military presence in the Middle East 
exceeded $50 billion in 2002 (The Ethanol Fact Book, 2007, published by the Clean Fuels 
Development)  Moreover, it is striking how the onset of the continuous rise in the price of oil 
from the late 1990s coincides with the growth trend in US ethanol production. No doubt the 
bombing of the Twin Towers in September 2001 contributed to the political impetus to improve 
energy security. Subsequently, a raft of new legislation and novel political instruments shaped 
the shift towards renewable fuels. In 2000 the Biomass R&D Act initiated a substantial 
programme of development of new technologies, led by the Department of Energy and the US 
Department of Agriculture. Increasingly, the funding has promoted ligno-cellulosic bioethanol. 
Two further major pieces of legislation, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the Energy 
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Independence and Security Act, 2007 (EISA),  introduced targets and mandated use of 
biofuels, initially 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. The legislation combined mandated markets for 
biofuels with requirements to reduce fossil fuel dependency by use of more energy-efficient 
vehicles: EISA famously required a reduction in oil use “Twenty in Ten”, a 20% reduction of 
fossil fuels within ten years of enactment.  Even more significant for the creation of future 
markets for biofuels, EISA mandates a steadily increasing volume of biofuel consumption to 
2022 (see figure 5). This measure not only guarantees a market for biofuels, but is also 
technology-forcing, by stipulating the ratio of biofuels from the existing corn-to-ethanol route 
to those produced by alternative techniques. As figure 5 shows, the volume of biofuels 
produced from maize is mandated to level off by 2015 at 15 billion gallons per year.  This 
means that the remaining mandated volume, a further 21 billion gallons by 2022, must be 
sourced from ‘advanced’ techniques, and the bulk of this should be lignocellulosic ethanol. 
Furthermore, the advanced fuels must deliver 60% (for lignocellulosic ethanol) or 50% (other 
advanced biofuel) greenhouse gas emission reductions, compared to a 2005 petroleum 
benchmark. So, this government measure is both market creating and technology forcing. It 
sets targets for volume and GHG performance and it specifies, to a large extent, the type of 
biofuel. But it is not pre-specified technology-forcing either, because the technology to be used 
to produce the advanced fuels is not pre-picked. So, there is considerable opportunity for 
experimenting with different technological approaches.  
 
Figure 5: The political regulation of market demand through mandates in the USA 
In addition to these radical market political instruments – quite contrary to free market 
rhetoric of the Bush administration and Republican party – the state has funded a succession 
of large-scale research programmes, and especially industry-academia collaborations to 
accelerate the passage from basic science, invention through to innovation and 
commercialisation. Described by the Secretary of State for Energy as the ‘Manhattan Project’ 
of the 21st century, parallels with the wartime directed economies are not so distant. The 
major difference, however, is that the strategy is now clearly longer term, with timescales of 
mandates in target stretching decades ahead. Thus the Genomics Systems Biology Program 
has been dedicated to addressing all phases of development, from development of biomass, 
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modification of  characteristics of plant cells, enzymatic catalysts for biorefinery, to new 
biofuels. The alliance between ADM and Purdue University in developing conversion of ligno-
cellulosic biomass to bioethanol using yeast, or the establishment of the Energy Bioscience 
Institute (EBI) comprising the Universities of Illinois, Urbana Champaign and the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory with BP, itself contributing $500 million (Blaschek, 2009), are 
exemplary of political shaping of the new bioenergy economy.  
As figure 6 shows, government investment into biofuels related research and development 
exceeds $1billion in range of programmes that go significantly beyond funding potentially 
relevant university research.  The two biorefinery initiatives, based on a grant and loan 
guarantee scheme, are intended to promote the nascent cellulosic ethanol industry by 
providing the necessary capital to take promising prototype technologies to commercial scale. 
It is striking, in relation to this, that the guaranteed market has not been deemed sufficient to 
provide incentives for private capital to support these initiatives. In this ambitious policy, 
government also needs to fund the development and scaling up of supply capabilities too.  
These policy measures have helped to consolidate the emergence of a new class of economic 
agent within and across the agribusiness and energy industrial division of labour. A relatively 
small number of new firms have emerged to exploit a particular technology platform for the 
production of cellulosic ethanol. They compete with each other on the basis of their respective 
technological visions and their ability to secure investment from public and private actors.  
 
Figure 6: The promotion of innovation through to commercialisation in the USA 
Although the NIS literature referred to above has emphasised the complementarity between 
publicly funded basic science and corporate R&D, what is distinctive about the current political 
strategy is both the greater integration between public and corporate activity dissolving to an 
extent the division of labour between them; the strategic goal direction; and the urgency of 
the programme, setting time frames for results. In innovation terms, it can be seen as 
‘directed evolution’ – a combination of strong steering, but retaining the context for variety 
generation through competing initiatives. Following and adapting Tushman and Anderson 
(1986), we might describe this early phase of the new industry as a directed era of ferment. 
Europe has no programme of an equivalent scale for the development of biofuels, and there 
can be little doubt, especially after the UN Copenhagen summit on climate change in 
December 2009, and the inability of the US president to commit to targets of carbon gas 
reduction, that the primary political consensus that underlies the US drive to biofuels is based 
on concerns of energy security and independence. 
Taken overall, the US political shaping of the transition to biofuels entails a significant 
departure from its traditional governance of the economy whether Democrat or Republican: 
mandated markets, targets for fuel substitution, fiscal incentives on the demand side; massive 
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and strategically oriented state funding of research and research and development, including 
demonstration plants and commercialisation promotion, on the supply side. This political 
shaping is a long way from the command economy of wartime, and has some quite different 
characteristics as a long-term peacetime strategy, but nonetheless reflects a shift in political 
governance in the face, in the US case, of issues of energy scarcity and security. Although the 
Obama presidency is suggesting an important move towards strategies also oriented by 
concerns to mitigate global climate change, the main impulse so far are delivering those 
outcomes, almost as in early-phase Brazil, as accidental collateral benefits. The irony is that 
these regions may be delivering these outcomes with greater urgency and rapidity than 
Europe, where global climate change has been uppermost in shaping the agenda for renewable 
energy. 
5.3 “Europe” 
There is considerable and significant variety within Europe in the transition to renewable 
energy to drive the transport fleets, and there is no intention here to treat Europe as an 
homogenous entity. Nonetheless, the justification for treating Europe as a region is firstly that 
European political direction and legislation has been significant in shaping transition, and 
secondly, there are some distinguishing features common to most of Europe, that stand in 
stark contrast to Brazil or the USA, both in terms of resource endowments and market 
characteristics.  
Firstly, Europe overall has experienced a quite rapid and remarkable ‘dieselisation’ of its car 
fleet, as demonstrated in the switch in dominant fuel use in Europe in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7: The consumption of petrol and diesel in Europe, 1990-2005. Source: European 
Biodiesel Association 
Currently, over 70% of all new vehicles purchased in Germany, France, Italy and Spain are 
diesel, creating a significant historical fleet legacy. As a direct consequence of this fossil fuel 
legacy, biodiesel currently represents 80% of all biofuel usage in the EU. Of this total, 80% 
derives from rapeseed. The growth in production of biofuels in Europe is radically different 
from that in Brazil or the USA, both in its timing – scarcely any initial phase dating from the oil 
shocks – and its content, as illustrated in Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8: The growth of biofuel production in Europe, 1993-2004. Source: Biofuels Research 
Advisory Council, 2006 
As a consequence of dieselisation, the second distinctive European characteristic entails 
resource endowment, in particular the already established agriculture of rapeseed oil. First 
used primarily for food and industrial purposes, a massive switch in use and expansion of 
rapeseed cultivation has constituted the primary biomass for biofuel. Rapeseed is 
predominantly a temperate zone crop, suited to European agriculture. In contrast to 
sugarcane, however, its GHG savings are at most one third as significant (Fritsche et al. 2008; 
CONCAWE, 2007), a level of savings which has a political significance to which we shortly 
return. But as a consequence, the European Union produces approximately 60% of the world’s 
biodiesel,21 and only 10% of the quantity of US ethanol. The significance of this resource 
endowment characteristic is demonstrated by the exceptional case of Sweden, which, as one of 
the leading European consumers of biofuels, imports Brazilian ethanol, under special 
exemption legislation from the EU: its biomass potential excludes rapeseed as a significant 
source, and ethanol from wood alcohol, given the slow growth, low sun, environment, inclines 
Sweden bioenergy dependent for external resources. 
In terms of the political shaping of the transition to biofuels in Europe, political instruments 
were developed relatively late compared to the other regions, with the first European Directive 
(European Commission, 2003) appearing in 2003, followed by a further Directives on 
Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality in 2009 (European Commission, 2009). In policy terms, 
they established some parameters for stimulating the development and adoption of biofuels, 
setting overall targets for use of renewable energy for transport. The subsidiarity principle 
allowed for, and indeed provoked, a wide heterogeneity of national biofuels policies across 
Europe, ranging from mandatory usage (the Renewable Fuels for Transport Obligation) in the 
United Kingdom to fiscal incentives to production and use of biofuels at varied rates both 
within and between countries for different biofuels (biodiesel and ethanol) and at different 
levels of blends. 
In marked contrast to the other regions also, the dominant orientation of the legislation was 
                                           
21 OECD (2008) Biofuel Support Policies; An Economic Assessment 
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developed first in the context of the EU’s adherence to the Kyoto Protocol process, and the aim 
to reduce carbon gas emissions. Fostering European agriculture was a secondary support to 
the policy, and only recently has energy security emerged as a subsidiary aim (Londo and 
Deuwaarder, 2007). So the setting of targets was addressing the issue of GHG emission 
mitigation, rather than finding a long-term alternative to diminishing fossil fuel resources, or 
political insecurity of supply. The first targets set in 2003 aimed at achieving 5.75% of biofuels 
for transport fuels by 2010, a relatively modest target, but, without the type of measures 
adopted in other regions, one that has not been reached by any European country, except 
Germany. The actual level of UK replacement of petrol/diesel with biofuels stood at 2.6 per 
cent in 2009 (Renewable Fuel Agency, 2009), far below Germany (7.3 per cent; Government 
of Germany, 2008), France (3.57 per cent; French Authorities, 2008), and Sweden (4 per 
cent; Swedish Government, 2008). 
However, between the first EU Directive and the second, major controversies emerged over 
the policy on biofuels, with the papers of Searchinger (2008) and Fargione (2008) having a 
distinctively European impact – given the orientation of the initial policy. These papers raised 
new questions on the sustainability of biofuels, especially as a consequence of Indirect Land 
Use Change resulting from the switching the use of maize in the US from food (animal and 
human) to fuel (bioethanol). At the same time, food price spikes in 2008 were also widely 
attributed to the use of food crops for biofuels. Here is not the place to discuss both these two 
issues, beyond noting that they have since been subject to considerable controversy and 
criticism (McMeekin et al. 2009; Pilgrim and Harvey, forthcoming). Nonetheless, the 
environmentalist and food NGOs took full advantage of the controversies to campaign 
vigorously for a moratorium on biofuel adoption, supported by environmentalist political 
parties across Europe. In the UK, a report was urgently commissioned which urged caution, 
and the application of much stricter sustainability criteria to biofuels, and the restriction of use 
of land for production of biofuels to degraded, non-food agricultural land (Gallagher, 2008).  
Although the change in European policy evident in the 2009 directive cannot be attributed 
solely to these political responses to Searchinger and food price rises,  the 2009 Renewable 
Energy Directive is significant in a shift from promoting biofuels to ‘renewable energy’ of any 
kind for road transport in setting its revised targets. This specifically allows for national policies 
to promote electric cars, provided that they use ‘green electricity’ to a sufficient extent.22 The 
new target of 10% renewable energy for transport by 2020, both in terms of level and 
direction of support for biofuels, contrasts markedly with either the achievements or ambitions 
of the policies of Brazil or the USA.  
Moreover, and more significantly, it established a regulatory regime for the sustainability of 
biofuels for the first time. The Directive requires 35% greenhouse gas savings from now until 
2017, and 60% GHG savings from new installations and processes thereafter. A review, and 
possible tightening of sustainability criteria, is timetabled for 2013. The Fuel Quality Directive 
requires the continued provision of petrol with a maximum of 5% ethanol blend until 2013, 
and the gradual phasing in of 10% bioethanol (E10) over the coming years. It also requires a 
6% reduction in GHG emissions from units of energy supplied for transport fuels by 2020. 
The GHG emission reduction targets have been set at 35% conveniently to allow the continued 
production of biodiesel from rapeseed, produced in Europe, until 2017. This corresponds, 
moreover, to governmental policy in France, where national quotas for biodiesel have been 
set, and granted to the national rapeseed farmers federation (Sofiproteol and Diester 
Industrie), giving them a national monopoly of biodiesel production. The policy has been 
described as ‘green protectionism’ (Erixon, 2009), particularly in relation to ethanol imports, 
now under a protective tariffs ranging from 39% to 63%. Nonetheless, the charge of ‘green 
protectionism’ from a WTO perspective points to European regulation being ahead of the 
game, on the one hand, and to major obstacles to achieving internationally agreed 
sustainability standards on the other. However, the sustainability requirements beyond 2017 
will present a considerable obstacle to using rapeseed as the feedstock for biodiesel. Ironically, 
although receiving much less environmentalist scrutiny than the maize for ethanol effects on 
                                           
22 There is considerable controversy over the sustainability benefits of electric cars, given that the current battery 
technologies result in a suboptimal level of use of green electricity, as a consequence of energy degradation between 
generation and use. 
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Indirect Land-Use Change, the switch from oil from rapeseed for food and industrial uses to 
biodiesel has undoubtedly been a much more direct and immediate stimulus to the increasing 
imports of palm oil, and the expansion of palm oil production in Indonesia. More ironically still, 
the application of sustainability regulation to biofuels alone,23 without the active political 
direction of finding technological alternatives to liquid fossil fuels of sufficient scale or scope, 
may result in the accidental collateral damage of achieving less sustainability than the two 
regions that have not imposed any sustainability regulation. Current failures to meet even 
modest targets are indicative in this respect. Yet, the singling out of biofuels for special 
sustainability regulation treatment highlights the difficulties of developing a political framework 
for regulating sustainability, establishing standards and measurements, across the full range of 
production and consumption. 
“Europe” thus shows great heterogeneity – Sweden importing Brazilian ethanol at one 
extreme, France fuelling itself on home-grown biodiesel at the other – but provides widespread 
evidence of new forms of political regulation of economies. The long term strategic targets and 
the ratcheting-up of sustainability standards are different from measures taken in other 
regions, but no less radical. Both the heterogeneity and the fact that biofuel sustainability has 
been so contentious in Europe reveal the consequences of the politicisation of markets, and 
the fact that experimentation with different political modes of governance leads to outcomes 
that entail compromise and conflict. The sustainability regime in Europe, up to this point, can 
be seen as quite unstable compromise between outright opposition to biofuels, and attempts to 
promote technological routes to renewable and sustainable transport energy. To achieve 
regional political unity of purpose presents difficulties quite peculiar to the European political 
environment. 
6 PATHWAYS AND POLITICISATION 
The modes of political governance of capitalist economies developed since the Second World 
War appear incapable of addressing the present major challenges to economic stability, let 
alone growth, arising from global climate change and petro-chemical depletion. From the 
evidence in three regions, Brazil, the USA and Europe, new modes of politically instituting 
economies of energy, here discussed in relation to biofuels and transport energy, some quite 
novel long term strategic shaping of transitions away from fossil fuel dependency are at the 
early stages of emergence. These are summarised in Table 1 below.  
There have been many studies looking at the policy options that could or should be mobilised 
to stimulate environmental innovations (Soete and Arundel, 1995) and more broadly to 
precipitate a transition to more sustainable socio-technical systems (Kemp, 1997). These 
studies provide ample evidence that a policy toolkit exists and is being used by governments 
to stimulate innovation, but it typically stops short of asking what this means for our 
understanding of how capitalist political economies might be changing in response to the 
growing sustainability challenge. This is what we have set out to do on this paper. We have 
suggested that the early experiments in policy design to deal with CFCs, lead in petrol, SOx 
emissions and so on could well prove to be the harbingers of a more profound shift in 
economic governance at national and international scales.  
Developing the issue further, challenges of environmentally sustainable economic growth have 
the potential to elicit a transformation in capitalist political economies and the ways that they 
are politically instituted to generate new knowledge to solve societal problems. This is going 
further than considering the policies that might be mobilised to steer innovation systems in a 
different direction. It is closer to the types of sweeping change described by Freeman and 
Perez, but in this instance politico-economic transformation is not an adaptation to the 
emergence of new technological systems, but precondition for their active development.  
To look at these potentially sweeping changes, three distinctive pathways, derived not only 
                                           
23 No sustainability criteria are imposed on fossil fuels, such as petrol or diesel, even though the increasing reliance on 
non-conventional resources over coming decades (tar sands, shale oil, deep sea oil) results inevitably in an increasing 
carbon footprint. Even with conventional oil extraction, there is considerable variability in footprint depending on the 
extent of flaring.  Equally, no equivalent sustainability criteria are in force for other types of agricultural biomass, 
whether used for food , cosmetics or other industrial purposes. 
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from pre-existing conditions and natural resource endowments, but from different political 
cultures and regimes, have been analysed. Abstractly, there are some important common and 
novel features, as well as some shared instruments. Perhaps the most important entails the 
development of a political orientation of innovation – directed evolution and development – 
guiding a long-term strategy of transition. The orientation of that direction differs markedly 
between the three regions: broadly, development, energy security, and global market 
opportunity arising from the drive to sustainability in Brazil; overwhelmingly an orientation of 
energy independence and security in the USA; and greenhouse gas emission reduction and 
sustainability in Europe. But they are all long-term transition strategies, shaping innovation 
pathways. We have seen just how different are the consequences of these political orientations 
and natural resource endowments: advanced and advancing technologies of sugarcane based 
ethanol and green electricity in Brazil; maize and second generation ligno-cellulosic ethanol in 
the USA; rapeseed oil based bio-diesel and largely imported bioethanol in Europe. There are 
also marked differences in what is included in the technological system: in Brazil, notably, we 
have seen the emergence of a novel fuel-powertrain system; in both the USA and Europe, a 
more directive policy towards fuel, with some stimulation of a shift to electric cars, but without 
an overall systemic energy-powertrain innovation drive. 
In addition to the orientation of the politically directed innovation pathways, there has been a 
raft of political instruments, some of which are common across regions. Mandates for fuels, 
combined with targets for growth in their market share, provide an example of strong, 
obligatory demand regulation, an innovatory political technology for bringing about transition. 
More traditional fiscal incentives have been widespread. Brazil and the USA stand out for the 
scale and strategically pro-active, long-term, state engagement in direction and funding of 
scientific development, R&D, and the commercialisation of new technologies related to energy 
transition.  
The three pathways differ both in the force with which the State has been directing innovation 
and the degree to which the intervention has attempted to produce technological variety. For 
Brazil, the state has been the principal driver, with a tight focus on one technological trajectory 
developed by a very small number of firms. The result has been the establishment of a highly 
successful biofuel innovation capability, but one based on relatively little technological variety 
and competition. In the European case, state intervention has been weaker, but still 
significant. There is considerable variety, but limited progress in the technology development. 
The USA example has combined the strong forcing of the Brazil case, but with an effort to 
maintain a relatively high degree of technological variety. In this case, there are multiple 
firms, and types of firms, competing within the politically constructed trajectory. These 
differences illustrate the complex interactions between political and economic modes of 
instituting economies of energy. 
But, as has been manifest more broadly in the Kyoto Protocol and its successor UN initiative at 
the Copenhagen conference, politicisation of the direction of economic innovation brings 
political controversy and conflict in its trail. In the USA, energy security and independence can 
lead to strong measures to reduce dependency on imported fossil fuels, hence, collaterally 
bring about reductions in GHG emissions. But political consensus on the regulation of 
sustainability, in the face of powerful oil interests and global climate change sceptics, is 
currently obstructing the development of a long-term sustainability strategy as a driving force 
of innovation in the USA. In Europe, conflicts around technological solutions to sustainability 
have resulted in uneven and highly partial sustainability regulation, and relatively low level of 
political drive to address the consequences of petro-chemical depletion by promoting active 
development of alternatives to fossil fuels. The concern to meet carbon reduction targets 
overshadows concerns to free transportation from reliance on oil, hence the modest targets for 
renewable transport energy characteristic of Europe. Uniquely in Brazil, achievements of high 
levels of sustainable transport energy has been supported, over a long period, by a sustained 
consensus for achieving development based on natural endowments, whether from sugarcane 
or hydro-electricity, even across a major rupture in political regime from military dictatorship 
to presidential parliamentary democracy. 
This contrasting picture of pathways to politically instituted economies of transport energy in 
the three regions leaves many issues unresolved. Attaining international standards for 
sustainability, across the full range of production and consumption, and an international 
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political drive to post-fossil fuel economies, are certainly not facilitated by these divergences of 
orientation and trajectory. In some ways, biofuels have provided a touchstone for exploring 
these dynamics: at least in Europe, the introduction of novel bio-based fuels, competing for 
use of land with production of food, brought to the surface much broader question of 
sustainable economic growth. As such, these biofuel pathways only reveal the scale and 
complexity of bringing about the major transformation required. The question is not so much 
the transition to any one techno-economy of energy, for transport or any other sector, but the 
transition to new, and international, forms of political governance of capitalist economies. We 
hope that this preliminary analysis of biofuel pathways has begun to ask that question in a 
more systematic and integrative manner. 
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Table 1: Three pathways to politically instituted economies of transport energy. 
 USA Brazil “Europe” 
Biofuel technology 
systems 
1.Maize to ethanol up to 
2002 – oil shocks and 
Energy Security Act 
1980 
2. First emergence of 
commercial ligno-
cellulosic ethanol 
1. Sugarcane based 
ethanol – oil shocks 
2. 100% ethanol car fleet, 
followed by FFV. 
3. Emergence of biodiesel 
4. Co-products and bio-
electricity 
1. Rapeseed based 
biodiesel, small scale 
bioethanol, multi-sourced. 
Resource endowments 1971 peak oil, corn belt, 
extensive land mass 
Sun, sugar, new oil, 
extensive land mass 
North sea past peak oil  
Sugar beet, rapeseed 
Countries with limited land 
mass 
Dominant drivers 1. Energy Independence 
and security 
1. Energy independence 
2. International market 
opportunity 
1. Climate change 
mitigation 
GHG mitigation gains Maize-ethanol LOW 
Ligno-cellulosic HIGH 
Sugarcane HIGHEST RME biodiesel MEDIUM 
Target-setting for shift 
to biofuels v alternatives 
High targets, 30% by 
2030; 20% reduction of oil 
by 2010. 
2005 Energy Policy Act 
No ethanol targets, but 
price regulation, followed 
by liberalisation. 40% 
bioethanol achieved by 
2008 
Renewable Energy 
Directives 2003 and 2009, 
moderate targets, subject 
to downward revision 
State shaping of 
innovation 
Large scale investment in R 
& D 
Grant and loan guarantee 
scheme for first-of-kind 
commercial scale 
biorefineries. 
Biomass Research and 
Development Initiative 
Genes-to-Life 





State promoted vehicle 
manufacture (Centro de 
Tecnologia Aeronautica) 
deals for 100% and FFV. 
Petrobras as quasi-state oil 
company coordinating bio- 
and fossil fuel 
FAPESP supported 
Bioenergy ‘BioEn’ 
programme, full spectrum 
research crop to wheel. 
FP7 initiatives on bioenergy 
and biorefinery, relatively 
small scale. 
Tax incentives for energy 
efficient cars. 
State shaping of market 
demand 
Mandates for biofuels 
Mandate for l-c set at 36 
billion gallons by 2022. 
Tax incentives for fuel 
blends 
Mandates for biodiesel 
Tax incentives for FFVs, 
cross subsidisation of fuel 
price 
Direct market price 
regulation then relative 
deregulation 
Mandates 
Tax incentives for biodiesel, 
and bioethanol – now 
withdrawn 
State shaping of 
sustainability regulation 
None with respect to 





Better Sugar Initiative 
GHG saving standards, 
35% saving as minimum, 
rising to 50% by 2017. 
State shaping of 
international trade 
Tariff barriers Major exporter to US, 
Europe (esp Sweden), 
market-led, state-
supported. 
Tariff barriers, plus some 




Insignificant Insignificant Major role of NGOs 
influencing sustainability 
regulation and target 
moderation. 
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